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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Interest in how people make judgments about the likelihood of future
events has sparked a lively area of theory and research over the past
decade. The psychology of prediction has burgeoned across the tradi-
tional psychological interest areas. The intriguing and compelling work
of Kahneman and Tversky (1972) has motivated a number of studies that
demonstrate how subjects utilize important information inappropriately
and are less than accurate in making predictions when compared with
normative models. Since this original work, several researchers (Lyon
and Slovic, 1976, Bar-Hillel, 1977, Ajzen, 1977) have manipulated aspects
of the information provided subjects during performance of a prediction
task in an attempt to determine when and under what conditions certain
types of information are used or ignored.
The present research is concerned with these questions: what infor-
mation do people use and why do they use it when making a prediction?
The focus of the paper is on the prediction task as a process. Instead
of contending that one type of information will be used and another
type will not, this paper suggests that information is used if it sat-
isfies a logical causal process established by an individual when faced
with the task of making a prediction. The nature or content of an iso-
lated piece of information is less critical than how that information
fits into the process.
In order to understand this approach, it is appropriate to pre-
sent a brief overview of existing prediction research. Much of this
research has been concerned with the use and nonuse of base-rates and
2with the impact of these base base-rates on predictions. Consequently,
special emphasis is placed upon that type of research. Then a selected
summary of some attribution literature is presented, as it may offer a
way to explore the prediction process. Conclusions drawn from this
summary will provide a framework upon which the present research is
based.
Prediction
At present a majority of the empirical work on prediction has
been primarily concerned with a comparison of the outcomes predicted
by normative models and the results actually obtained when individuals
are asked to make predictions about the future occurance of an event.
Such work has not consistently addressed the way people evaluate the
information that is available to them or how they determine its rel-
evence to a given population.
Typical of this approach, and of particular interest to the
present research, is the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). They suggest that three general types of
information are relevant to predictions: 1) prior background information
(base-rates; 2) specific evidence concerning individual causes; 3)
expected accuracy of the prediction. From their research, they suggest
that people intuitively ignore factors and violate statistical rules
in systematic ways. They label these violations "heuristics." To
explain, one heuristic is what they term representativeness. Subjects
were presented with a series of short personality sketches of people
4on base-rates revised their earlier position that suggested people use
a "representativeness heuristic", and concurred with the Ajzen position.
They too developed the thesis that subjects will use base-rates when
they are perceived as causal and not ignore base-rates in all cases.
Base-rates
.
The Ajzen study (1977) explored base-rate use by varying the causal
nature of the content. He asked subjects to judge the likelihood that
a given student has passed a final exam. Half of the subjects were
given base-rates that provided causal information, the other half were
given non-causal base-rates. The causal base-rates reported that 75%
of the students in a given course passed (failed) an exam. Ajzen in-
ferred that this sort of base-rate carried a causal component: infor-
mation concerning the ease or difficulty of the exam. The non-causal
base-rate reported that an educational psychologist interested in
scholastic achievement interviewed a large number of students who had
taken a course and since he was primarily interested in reactions to
success (failure), he selected mostly students who had passed (failed).
This format of the base-rate was presented as carrying no causal com-
ponent; no conclusions about the ease or difficulty of the exam could
be drawn. Ajzen found that the "causal base-rate" was used by subjects
when making their predictions, whereas, the "non-causal base-rate"
was not used. From these findings he concluded that use of a base-
rate is affected by whether or not it is causal in nature, and labled
this tendency as the "causality heuristic."
Nisbett and Borgida (1975) conducted a study that may raise some
problems for Ajzen's causality heuristic. They gave subjects the
percentage results from a previous experiment on helping behavior and
asked them to predict how likely a particular subject was to have helped
the individual in distress. Their findings indicate that subjects did
not use the base-rates (the actual results or numbers of people who
helped) when making their predictions. The nature of the base-rate'
in this study is similar in fashion to the causal base-rate Ajzen
provided his subjects. The causal link established by the data on
helping behavior parallels the inferred ease of an exam and/or the
brightness of the students from the Ajzen study, yet the base-rate
was not used. It appears that the general statement that subjects will
use base-rates if they are perceived as causal may not hold true in
all situations. At the vary least, review of the Nisbett and Borgida
study in this light sheds some doubt on the general i zabi 1 i ty of the
"causality heuristic."
Tversky and Kahneman (1977) attempt to resolve the apparent con-
flict between these two studies. They suggest that "base-rate data
which describe the difficulty or attractiveness of an action are used
when they complete a schema that is not fully specified, but not when
they conflict with an existing schema" (p. 33). This would seem to
imply that conditions in the Ajzen study present schema which are not
"fully specified;" the causal base-rate completes this schema and is
used, but the non-causal base-rates either conflicts with or does not
fully round out the schema and is not used. This form of post hoc
explanation, which is difficult to fully comprehend, sheds little light
upon the predictable use of base-rates.
Other research has addressed the issue of conditions under which
base-rates are used or ignored. Lyon and Slovic (1976) manipulated
particular aspects of the base-rate information given subjects. They
varied the order of presentation of base-rates and case descriptions
(individuating information), the base-rate precentages as well as the
stated validity of the base-rates, and they still found base-rates to
be under utilized or ignored. Though the findings were pervasive,
they were unable to offer any general i zabl e reason for this finding.
Bar-Hi 11 el (1977) has attempted to codify the plethora of explana-
tions and interpretations of the base-rate phenomena and has concluded
that "people order items according to their perceived relevance to the
required judgment. More relevant items dominate less relevant ones.
Items are combined only if they are perceived as equally relevant.
The base-rate fallacy [underuse of base-rates] is a direct result of
these base-rates having been (subjectively) less relevant than the in-
dicators" (p. 9). Bar-Hi 1 lei did not directly measure "relevance," but
rather intuitively identified items as "more or less relevant." She
designed over 40 situations and presented them to 1500 students in
order to test her hypothesis. Her results clearly demonstrate both
the general izabi 1 i ty of the base-rate fallacy, as well as considerable
support of exceptions to it. Under conditions that she "designed"
to make base-rate relevant, she found that subjects did use base-
rate informations in making predictions. Her subjects were given in-
formation about the number of blue vs. green cabs in a city and a case
of an eyewitness report concerning the color of a cab involved in an
accident. The eyewitness was characterized as being able to identify
7the color of the cab correctly "about 80% of the time, but confusing
it with the color of the other cab about 20% of the time" (p.l).
Given such individuating information, subjects ignored the base-rate
(percentage of green vs. blue cabs) and based their judgments solely
upon the data from the eyewitness. However, when the base-rate infor-
mation concerning cabs was made relevant, a different pattern emerged.
Relevance was introduced by giving subjects a base-rate that 85% of
the cab accidents in the city involve green cabs and 15% involve blue
cabs, followed by the eyewitness report. In this case both individu-
ating information and base-rate were used in making a judgment. Bar-
Hi 1 lei concluded that such results support the relevance hypothesis,
even though no direct relevance measure was taken for subjects and
alternate explanations may exist.
The present state of affairs regarding use or non-use of base-
rates is in greater flux than after the initial experiments that pro-
posed people predict by using "heuristics." Fewer consistencies have
been discovered and the impact of content, intuitive relevance or
causality and post hoc explanations each offers some form of interpre-
tation .
Prediction and attribution work have been, for the most part pur-
sued from separate and distinct theoretical frameworks and research
paradigms. Fischoff (1976) has highlighted these differences. He
suggested that attribution research finds people to be effective pro-
cessors of information who organize their world in a systematic way
with few biases; whereas, judgment research reveals people to be quite
inept information processors. It is appropriate to reflect upon the
8Impact these different fundamental conceptual biases may have on the
research that is designed and the interpretations that are favored by
these empirical traditions. But the focus of the present paper is on
the insights that may be generated when attribution theory and research
are brought to bear upon the process of predicting. Because of the
similarities between base-rates and consensus information, particular
attention will be paid to attribution literature that pertains to the
use of consensus data.
Attribution
.
Attribution is a process whereby an individual "explains" hi';
world. In an attempt to impose order and meaning on the maze of events
daily encountered, people seem to find comfort in believing that things
do not just randomly happen; they happen "because..." Heider (1958)
was concerned with the phenomenological picture all people have of
themselves and other people. He suggested that people, seeking to
establish cognitive consistency, explain responses and situations by
integrating certain cues and inferring more stable factors from them,
i.e., they make attributions. Heider was interested in the common
tendency for a person to see others as having caused their actions,
and in particular, in whether a person's behavior was seen as a result
of internal or external forces.
Kelley (1967) detailed a more precise and general izable model of
attribution. He pointed to three kinds of information which determine
internal vs. external attribution. The first, distinctiveness infor-
mation, refers to whether the person being considered makes the same
9kind of response to many different kinds of entities or whether the
response is made only to this particular class of entities. The second
is consensus information which refers to whether other persons would
be likely to make the same response in the same situation. The third
is modality/time information from which one infers consistency, i.e.,
whether or not a particular response occurs whenever a particular
stimulus is present. Generally these factors are considered in com-
bination, as in the example:
John likes very few movies, but does like a par-
ticular movie (high distinctiveness); everyone
else likes this particular movie (high consensus)
and John's liking for the movie does not depend
on whether he sees it at home or in the theater
(high consistency). Under these conditions, one
can be relatively certain that John's liking for
a particular movie is a function of the movie,
rather than of John. The attribution would be
an external one. (Kelley, 1967)
McArthur (1972) designed an approach for testing the Kelley model.
Basically she attempted to study how attributions are facilitated by
various combinations of consensus, distinctiveness and consistency
information. Her findings suggest that consistency and distinctive-
ness are more informative than consensus information. This lack of
impact of consensus information on attribution has generated a consid-
erable body of work in an attempt to discover when and under what
conditions consensus information might be used. [See, for example,
Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed (1976), Hansen and Donoghue (1977)]
A short summary of these studies may demonstrate the status of
understanding which exists concerning the use of consensus information,
Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed (1976) failed to find an impact
of consensus information on self-attribution. They asked subjects to
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eat crackers and drink a sweetened liquid and then to compare the
amounts they consumed with other subjects. The subjects were then
asked to explain why they ate and drank the amounts they did. Their
findings indicated no impact of consensus information. The subjects
did not use the information on the amounts consumed by others when
explaining their own behavior. Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed
argue that one reason for this may be that consensus information is
"abstract, pallid and remote" and that perceivers tend to rely on per-
ceptually vivid data for making an inference (p. 127). In this light
it would be expected that subjects would ignore the consensus infor-
mation on personal attributions. They suggest that knowledge of one's
own behavior in a given situation renders sample-based consensus less
compelling. Additional explanations exist to account for the failure
of subjects to use consensus information. Wells and Harvey (1977) and
Hansen and Donoghue (1977) demonstrated that subjects were less willing
to use consensus when the representativeness of the sample was in ques-
tion. When the randomness of the information was assured, (Wells and
Harvey, 1977) subjects were more likely to utilize the data.
The original Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall, and Reed study (1976) was
predominantly concerned with subjects' attributions for their own be-
havior. Hansen and Stoner (1978) in a replication of this study also
asked subjects to explain the behavior of other persons. They were
asked to make causal attributions about the impact of the crackers'
taste on other subjects' thirst. The results indicated a failure of
the consensus information to have an impact on the observers' judge-
ments of the taste of the crackers. However, when asked to determine
n
how thirsty the subjects were, the consensus information did have a
great deal of influence. Hansen and Stoner conducted additional exper-
iments designed to explore the factors influencing these different
patterns of results. Generally, their findings indicated that whether
explaining one's own behavior or anothers, people are quite willing
to infer dispositions discrepant from that of the consensus. Observers
were more likely than actors to infer stimulas attributes from consensus
information and there was a greater impact of consensus on observers
than actors when making a causal attribution. However, even observers
did not use consensus information in all cases. Hansen and Stone suggest
that this is a result of their inability to infer a clear and logical
relationship between consensus and the attribution. Kassin (1979) in
a recent literature review points out that existing evidence has dem-
onstrated that consensus has a substantially larger effect on the
attribution of occurrances than on actions.
Hansen and Lowe (1976) suggest that the underuse of consensus
information may be a result of an individual's ability to generate
a "consensus" by virtue of knowing or surmising what his or her own
behavior might have been in a given situation. Feldman, Higgins,
Karlovac, and Ruble (1976) suggest that the use of consensus information
may be related to the subjects receiving information about the target
person. With information from their own personal experience with the
stimulas, or enough information to take the role of the target person,
consensus has no impact. However, without such information consensus
may be utilized by subjects when making an inference.
This brief review of attribution literature indicates the complexity
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of findings concerning the use of consensus information. In some con-
ditions studies demonstrate that subjects do use consensus information,
but in others they seem to ignore it. Although the various authors
have offered explanations as to why subjects do or do not utilize
consensus information, none has outlined a comprehensive framework
that would parsimoniously account for the existing data, let alone -
allow for the generation of predictions about the conditions for use
of consensus data.
The close relationship of the attribution task and the prediction
task, and the similarities and differences between base-rates and con-
sensus information, have not escaped the scrutiny of several authors.
Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall and Reed (1976) state "an attribution, more-
over, is more complicated and indirect inference than a prediction"
(p. 124). "When faced with the task of making a prediction, subjects
are asked to produce a rather direct and uncomplicated chain of infer-
ences. If the majority of members of the population belong to a par-
ticular category, the odds are the target does also" (p. 124). In
attribution, a still more elaborate chain of inferences is requested.
"If the majority of the population behave in a particular way, then the
situation must exert strong pressure toward that behavior and, there-
fore, it is unparsimonious to involve personal i diosyncracies to account
for the behavior that is modal" (p. 124). Ajzen (1977) points out an
important difference between the effect of the base-rates on prediction
and consensus information in attributions. He suggests that in the
case of predictions, base-rates directly affect the event's (objective)
probability, since they provide actual facts about the relative frequency
13
of the event to be predicted. However, the link between an event's
relative frequency and a potential underlying disposition is merely
inferential
.
However, such explicit distinctions no longer seem so clear.
Recently, attribution researchers, troubled with the lack of impact
consensus information seems to have on attributions, have attempted
to understand the finding by citing the parallel to the underuse of
base-rate data found in prediction research. Nisbett, Borgida, Crandall
,
and Reed (1976) have made explicit the similarity between consensus in-
formation and base-rate information. "Consensus information is precisely
base-rate information. It is base-rate information about behavior
responses rather than category membership" (p. 124).
Ross (1977) has suggested an inherent connection exists between
the often distinct areas of attribution and prediction, that they are
implicitly related and the latter is a natural extension of the former.
"Explanations for and inference from an event are obviously and inti-
mately related and together they form an important basis for speculation
about unknown and future events" (Ross, 1977, p. 1975). How can the
attribution literature help explore the process of prediction making?
An important first consideration is "why does someone, outside of the
experimental setting, attempt to explain behavior or events, i.e.,
make attributions?" It seems logical that one dominant response might
be "to understand why something happened in order to predict what may
happen in the future." The example given earlier for attribution
dealt with John attending a movie. Someone might be interested in
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determining the reasons John likes a particular movie because of a
desire to decide whether or not it's worth spending money to go oneself
-- to make a prediction about movie quality.
The present study attempts to consider the two processes-attri-
bution and prediction—as parts of a whole and suggests an inherent
connection between them. Specifically, the contention is that when
faced with the task of predicting an event or behavior, one formulates
a sort of hypothesis that the specific event or behavior has occurred
and then seeks confirmation. The prediction question itself is con-
sidered as a "given." "How likely is John to attend a movie?" becomes
"John attended a movie. What factors suggest this to be true?"; "Why
might that be?"; or, "What may have caused this?" The task is now
akin to that of attribution. It is likely that the individual seeks
the potential causes of what might induce someone to see a movie (eg.:
moviebuff, excellent reviews for the movie, nothing else to do in a
particular town, etc.) and then attempts to establish which items of
information about John in this situation corresponds to these potential
causes. It is these items which are used, the others ignored when
making the actual likelihood judgment. In brief summary, an individual
may first consider the prediction question as a statement to be verified.
The task becomes one of attribution, explaining the factors which may
have caused the event to occur. Information which confirms this
"hypothesis" is utilized, otherwise it is ignored.
There is some evidence that people do exactly this type of hypo-
thesis confirming in other situations. Snyder (1979) has explored and
presented a theory concerning the way individuals hold onto preset
notions about people. His finding suggest that people engage in
behaviors that will confirm hypotheses already held. In a series of
investigations, his subjects preferentially solicited behavioral
evidence that tended to confirm their hypothesis by treating their
targets as if they were the type of person they were hypothesized to
be. They planned to search preferentially for behavior evidence that
would confirm their hypothesis." (p. 41). His findings concerning
hypothesis-testing strategies appear to be pervasive. It seemed to
matter not at all to participants where their hypothesis originated,
or how likely it was that their hypothesis would prove accurate or
inaccurate (implicit base-rate) or whether or not the hypothesis ex-
plicitly defined the confirming or disconfi rming attributes.
Snyder suggests that it may be this mechanism which helps so many
beliefs remain stubbornly resistant to change. Even when sufficient
doubt about the accuracy of a belief leads one to test it, one never-
theless may be likely to attend to only that evidence which would be
needed to confirm a belief. It is reasonable to consider these findings
in order to understand the proposed process of hypothesis testing that
one implicitly engages in when making a prediction.
Research question .
This paper suggests that people, when faced with the task of pre-
dicting, treat the prediction question as if it were an hypothesis
that requires confirmation. In order to elicit those factors which
confirm the hypothesis, the task implicitly becomes one of attribution,
or explaining what may have caused that particular event or behavior.
In such a process it is identification of the factors which establish
possible reasons for the event or situation occurring that letermines
which information is to be used.
It is possible that one way to treat this notion is to provide
subjects with base-rates for use as potential reasons. Base-rates
consist of knowledge about the relative frequency of an event in a
relevant population. Base-rates which would provide potential reasons
for an outcome would be "causal" in nature, i.e., present a logical
connection between the outcome and antecedents. Base-rates which would
not serve as potential reasons, would be non-causal or statistical and
offer no logical causal link. The Ajzen (1977) -paradigm suggests a
manner in which this information distinction may be established. He
provided a causal base-rate that inferred ease or difficulty of an
exam. "Causal base-rate information: Two years ago, a final exam was
given in a course at Yale University. About 75% of the students
passed (failed) the exam." (p. 308). The non-causal base-rate on the
other hand implied no such causal information about the exam, "non-
causal base-rate information: Two years ago, a final exam was given
in a course at Yale University. An educational psychologist interested
in scholastic achievement interviewed a large number of students who
had taken the course. Since he was primarily concerned with reactions
to success (failure), he selected mostly students who had passed
(failed) the exam. Specifically about 75% of the students in his
sample had passed (failed) the exam." (p. 308)
The other type of information to provide to subjects as possible
17
reasons for particular outcomes would be case histories or individu-
ating information. This would follow the Kahneman and Tversky (1972)
design and specifically provides data regarding the individual or
event in question. As opposed to information about population ratios,
this sort of information is singular. For the pupose of the present
study, both types of information, causal and non-causal base-rates
and individuating information, will be used. One study will look at
the possible combinations of base-rates alone and their impact on
predictions. In this fashion it is possible to make explicit predic-
tions about which base-rates will be used, i.e., in all cases causal
base-rates will be used when available, and only in their absence will
the non-causal base-rates be used. The causal nature of the base-
rates will provide compelling explanations for an event or behavior.
A second study will then consider how the use of causal and non-
causal base-rates is mediated by individuating information that is or
is not hypothesis confirming. Three types of individuating information
will be presented, 1) confirming, 2) disconfi rming, and 3) vague.
Hypothesis confirming data will provide information which is consistent
with and supportive of the hypothesis one naturally establishes from
the prediction question. Example: John attended a movie (from - How
likely is John to attend a movie?). Confirming individuating infor-
mation: John is a movie-buff and likes to go out often. Disconfi rming
data provides information that is in opposition to the hypothesis
established by the prediction question. Example: "John hates to
attend movies and hasn't seen one in years." This sort of information
would not tend to support the established hypothesis. Vague information
provides little to support or refute the hypothesis. Example: "John
is an English major and attends the state university". The second
study will combine either a causal or non-causal base-rate with one
of three types of individuating information, both items will be used
in generating the prediction. However, with non-confirming individu-
ating information, even the causal base-rate will be ignored and sub-
jects will rely solely upon the diagnosticity of the individual case
history. When information, that singular information will provide
the basis for the prediction and the base-rate will be ignored. Only
in the conditions when no individuating information is provided will
subjects use the non-causal base-rates.
CHAPTER II
STUDY I
Method
Subjects
.
The subjects were 40 American undergraduate students of both sexes in
the "Year Abroad Program" at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Par-
ticipation was entirely voluntary. Subjects were recruited from a
variety of courses and assigned at random and in equal numbers to the
four cells of the experimental design (10 subjects per cell).
Procedure .
The emperical core of the thesis was a collection of prediction problems
Each subject was instructed to read an introduction sheet (see Appen-
dix #1) which provided some information about the general health status
of college age students. They were then given one of the four pre-
diction problems which consisted of two different base-rates concerning
male and female propensity for contracting and/or suffering from a
particular illness. Two types of base-rates were used, causal and
statistical or non-causal J The different base-rates provided were
Note: Ajzen (1977) points out that causal and non-causal base-rates
for research purposes are based largely upon intuitive con-
sideration. Although manipulation checks validate these opinion,
we have only limited knowledge about the factors which lead
people to attribute causal characteristics to given variables.
19
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as follows:
Casual base-rate #1 read, "Records from Israeli University Health
services indicate that upper respiratory infections (common colds)
are the most common illnesses among all college age students. During
the 1978-79 academic year, 70% of all cases were of female students
and 30% were male students."
Causal base-rate #2 read, "Nationwide the percentage of upper
respiratory infections that last in excess of two weeks is three times
higher among male students than among female students."
Statistical base-rate #1 read, "A nursing student at Hebrew Univ-
ersity did a study on the health behavior of students. Because she
was primarily interested in how women react to illness, she chose to
interview mostly female students who had or were suffering from upper
respiratory infections (common colds). As a result, 70% of her sample
were women and only 30% of those interviewed were male students suffering
from upper respiratory infections."
Statistical base-rate #2a read, "As it turned out, she was also
interested in how the length of an illness affects males and females
differently. Consequently, she chose her subjects such that three times
more male students than female students had upper respiratory infections
that lasted in excess of two weeks."
Statistical base-rate #2b read, "At Hebrew University there are
three times more male students than female students."
As can be seen, the causal base-rates imply that female students
are more likely than male students to get ill (70/30) but that male
students who get ill are more likely to have the illness last longer
21
(3 times more likely). The statistical base-rates offer no such impli-
cations. Statistical base-rates #1 and #2a present population ratios
that were structured by the nursing student for her study and in no
way represents the natural state of affairs. The base-rates consequently
do not suggest anything about the nature of illness in males or females.
Statistical base-rate #2b is merely a peculation ratio and not in any
way connected to illness. The four conditions in this study are: 1)
causal base-rate #1, causal base-rate #2; 2) causal base-rate #1,
Statistical base-rate #2b; 3) statistical base-rate #1, causal base-
rate #2; and 4) statistical base-rate #1, statistical base-rate #2a.
For each condition, after reading the scenario, subjects were
asked to judge the likelihood of a person drawn at random with a parti-
cular illness being male. The question read, "What is the probability
that a student selected at random from those with upper respiratory
infections lasting in excess of two weeks was a male student?" Pre-
dictions were measured on a scale:
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Not at Absolutely
all likely likely
Participants were allowed as much time as they wanted to complete
the question and in no case did the amount of time exceed ten minutes.
After all questional' res were completed and returned, anyone wishing to
discuss the study was invited to remain. A number of students at each
administration session chose to remain and partake in the discussion.
The content of the stimulas materials seemed to generate a good deal of
22
interest and several students hoped the discussion could be a forum
for seeking professional advice.
Normative Prediction vs. Predictions
Suggested by the Theoretical Model
.
The thesis evolves a model that predicts in what conditions the
base-rates would be used. Bayes
' Rule suggests a proper normative
way to combine the two different pieces of information. In odds from,
this rule can be written as 0 = Z x R where 0 denotes the posterior
odds in favor of a particular inference; and R denotes the likelihood
ratio for that inference. In this study, of interest is the probability
that a student with a particular illness lasting over 2 weeks is a male
student. Denote illness in males and females by M and F, respectively,
and denote the duration of the illness by m.
n =
p (M/m)
_
P(m/M) P(M
P(F/m) " P(m/F) " PlF
in condition #1
75 .30 225
A
.25 " .70 175
P(M/m) =
T7f||r = .56
Therefore, the normative prediction under condition #1 would be
56%. In fact, for all cases, 56% would be the normative prediction
as it reflects the use of both base-rates. However, as has been
explained previously, the theoretical model of the paper suggests that
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the predictions made by subjects depends upon the perception of the
base-rate as causal or statistical.
For all conditions, it has been hypothesized that causal base-
rates be employed for making a prediction. That is, only in condition
4 will the statistical base-rates be used, and in conditions 1 , 2 and
3 the causal base-rates will be used exclusively.
Results
Table 1 presents the results and comparisons among the predicted
results that would be obtained by using Bayes 1 Rule.
Clearly, the results of conditions 1, 2 and 4 correspond directly
to the thesis' predictions. Both causal base-rates are used in condition
1 and, in fact, the results correspond almost exactly with a Baysian
combination of the information. As was predicted for condition 4, both
statistical base-rates were used as no cuasal base-rate was offered.
Once again the results fairly duplicate the answers arrived at through
Bayes' Rule. The distribution of the results (see graph 1) demonstrates
how consistent these responses are.
Conditions 2 and 3 provided one causal base-rate and one statistical
base-rate. The premise of this paper predicted use of only the causal
base-rate. The findings of .32 for condition 2 clearly demonstrates
this. Obviously the statistical information is ignored and only the -
30/70 ratio considered. In fact, all but 2 of the respondents gave 30
as their prediction. This is a predicted deviation from the results
one would obtain using Bayes' Rule. Condition 3 presents a deviation
from the correspondence between the predictions laid out in the paper
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and the results. Subjects seem to attempt to combine both base-rates
in some fashion and do not ignore the statistical base-rate. The mean
of
.49 is quite close to a simple unweighted average (.52) of the two
numbers offered by the base-rates. This finding is contrary to pro-
posals in the paper and different from the finding in condition #2
in which subjects do ignore the statistical base-rate and rely solely
upon the causal base-rate.
Discussion
.
When subjects are given two causal or two statistical base-rates,
they are able to combine them using a method whose outcome parallels
Bayes' Rule. Subjects do not show any of the Kahneman and Tversky
(1972) tendency to ignore or underuse a base-rate as long as the two
are of equivalent nature, i.e. statistical or causal. They, in fact,
appear to be quite competent Baysians. On the other hand, when the
base-rates are of mixed nature, i.e. one statistical and one causal,
they do not necessarily attend to both items of information. It is of
interest to consider why it is that in condition 2 the subjects totally
ignore the statistical base-rate (as per prediction) yet for condition
3 they attempt to use both base-rates. A critical look at the content
of the different statistical base-rates may suggest a reason for this
discrepancy. Statistical base-rate #2b presents a mere population
ratio and the number of male and female students is in no way specif-
ically related to the content in question (although it clearly would
affect the actual probabilities). The hypothesis that is established
by subjects from the prediction question is not related to this
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population ratio. On the other hand, statistical base-rate #1 presents
a relevant population so clearly that subjects find it almost impossible
to ignore. The health/illness content in statistical base-rate #1 and
#2a does relate to that which is to be predicted even though it does not
necessarily define a population for consideration. It provides a "because"
for the subjects' response to the prediction question and serves as a
sort of confirmation for any hypothesis established by the prediction
question. Statistical base-rates in previous research are often of
this population ratio type (Kahneman and Tversky, (1972)). However,
Ajzen (1977) used a similar statistical base-rate about a researcher
choosing to stratify a population such as was presented in statistical
base-rates #1 and #2a, and also found lack of impact. Why it is that
these results conflict with the Ajzen study finding of minimal impact of
non-causal base-rate is a question that requires further research. It
may be that subjects did see a "causal" aspect to the statistical base-
rates; or it may be that because of the two non-causal base-rates which
were used had explicit content related to the hypothesis subjects might
have generated for confirmation. Possibly confirmation is not based
upon whether or not information is causal, but whether it passes a
cursory requirement of serving as a "because".
CHAPTER HI
STUDY II
Method
Subjects
.
The subjects were 80 undergraduate American students of both sexes in
the "Year Abroad Program" at Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Partici-
pation was entirely voluntary, as it was with Study I. Subjects were
recruited from a variety of courses and assigned at random and in equal
numbers to the eight cells of the experimental design (10 subjects per
cell)
.
Procedure
.
Each subject was instructed to read an introduction sheet (see Appendix
#1) which provided some information about the general health status of
college age students. They were given one of six prediction problems
which presented one base-rate, either causal or statistical and a case
history about a coed named Deborah, i.e. indicant information. Two
additional conditions offered the base-rate only, with no case history.
Each subject answered only one question. They were instructed to make
a judgment about the likelihood of the person in question contracting
a particular illness. The question read, "What is the probability that
Deborah will develop an upper respiratory infection?"
The causal base-rate read, "Records from Israeli University Health
Services indicate that upper respiratory infections (common colds) are
25
26
the most common illnesses among all college age students. During the
1978-79 academic year, 70% of all female students contracted an upper
respiratory infection at some time during the year. Only 30% of the
female students did not."
The statistical base-rate read, "A nursing student at Hebrew Univ-
ersity did a study on the health behavior of students. Because she was
primarily interested in how women react to illness, she chose to inter-
view mostly female students who had or were suffering from upper respir-
atory infections (common colds). As a result, 70% of her sample were
women suffering from upper respiratory infections and only 30% of those
she interviewed were women who were not."
In conditions 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, the base-rate was followed by the
indicant information, or case history of the coed, Deborah. Three dif-
ferent cases were presented. In the positive conditions (conditions 1
and 5) the protagonist was portrayed as very active, under much pressure,
undernourished and generally prone to contracting upper respiratory
infection. The positive condition read, "Deborah Cohen is a Hebrew
University freshman who has an "undecided" major. She is interested
in history but wants to be able to find a job after graduation. Con-
sequently, she is carrying 18 credits for taking courses in several
departments in order to get a feel for what is offered. She is strug-
gling to maintain a B+ average. Deborah is very involved with social
activities and feels a great deal of pull from both academic and social
commitments. She finds little time to eat well and is slightly under-
weight. Deborah lives in the dorm and has two roommates."
The negative or non-confirming conditions (conditions 2 and 6)
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present a coed as being in very good health, under mild pressure and
consequently unlikely to contract an upper respiratory infection. The
negative condition read, "Deborah Cohen is a Hebrew University freshman
who has an "undecided" major. She is interested in history but wants to
be able to find a job after graduation. She is carrying 12 credits and
easily maintains a B+ average. Deborah is a health food enthusiast and
enjoys cooking her own meals. She runs at least 4 kilometers a day to
help her stay in shape. Deborah has a single room in the dorm."
The vague conditions (conditions 3 and 7) gave only a general des-
cription of the university coed. The vague condition read, "Deborah
Cohen is a Hebrew University freshman who has an "undecided" major.
She is interested in history but wants to be able to find a job after
graduation. She is carrying the usual 12 credits and maintains a B+
average.
"
Pretesting was conducted in order to establish that the cases were
in fact sufficiently strong to permit subjects to distinguish among them
Forty-eight undergraduates, not participants in the study itself, were
asked to read one of the three case histories and make a judgment as
to the 1 i k 1 i hood of Deborah contracting an upper respiratory infection.
There were 16 respondents for each history. The results for each con-
dition (X = .55 -- confirming or positive condition, X = .15 -- non-
confirming or negative condition, and X = .28 -- vague condition)
demonstrated a significant difference F (2,45) = 23.55, p. < .05. The
three were considered to be adequately divergent from one another. The
finding from this pilot testing also provided the numerical weight for
computing the predicting outcomes for the study itself by using Bayes'
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Rule. The final two conditions presented merely the base-rates with
no individuating information.
After reading the scenario, subjects were asked to predict the
liklihood of Deborah developing an upper respiratory infection. Their
judgments were measured on the following scale:
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Not at all (iL 1 j_ n
s;te,y
Participants were allowed as much time as they wanted to complete
the question and in no case did the amount of time exceed ten minutes.
After all questional" res were completed and returned, anyone wishing to
discuss the study was invited to remain. And as with Study 1, a number
of students at each administration session chose to remain and partake
in the discussion. The content of the stimulas materials seemed to
generate a good deal of interest and several students hoped the discus-
sions could be a forum for seeking professional health advice.
Results
The results for Study 2 are presented in Table 2. The "hypothesis
confirming" strategy that is suggested in this paper establishes differ-
ing predictions for each condition. Condition 1 and 3 provide causal
base-rates that establish hypotheses which are "confirmed" by the positive
and vague case histories. In these conditions it is predicted that
both items of information will be used by subjects to generate the
prediction. Condition #2 also provides a causal base-rate but it is
followed by a nonconfi rming case history. It is suggested that this
case history does not confirm the hypothesis established by the base-
rate and consequently it is predicted that the base-rate will be ignored
and only the case history used. Conditions 5, 6, and 7 provide statis-
tical base-rates. Because they in no way lend support to the hypothesis
established by the prediction question, they ought not to be used by
subjects for making their predictions. Conditions 4 and 8 provide only
a base-rate and in light of no additional information, it is predicted
that subjects will use the base-rates given.
Alternatively the predictions that are established by use of Bayes 1
Rule suggest that for all conditions the causal or statistical nature
of the base-rate is not relevant and the base-rates would be used to
the same extent in combination with the numerical weight of the indi-
vidual case-histories. For example, conditions 1 and 5 present the
subject with a base-rate of 70% of all female students contract an
upper respiratory and a positive case history that establishes Deborah
has a .55 chance of contracting the illness herself. Denote females
contracting the illness by I and females not contracting the illness
by N. Denote the likelihood of Deborah contracting the illness by i.
0 - mZjl - PjlZIl - P(I)
p~[n7TT " pUM " pW
.55 ,70
v
385
.45 .30 135
P(I/i)
= Tsfffss - 74
If subjects use a Baysian approach, their predictions about the
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likelihood of Deborah contracting the illness, both the base-rate and
case history, should be around 74%. For conditions 2 and 6 this per-
centage is 29% and for conditions 3 and 7 the percentage is 47%.
The most dramatic finding of the study is the lack of any difference
between the causal base-rate and the statistical base-rate impact on
the predictions. In all conditions they were used to relatively the
same extent. Additionally, subjects seemed to "systematically" use
both the base-rate and case history in making their predictions and
did not follow the results predicted either by the theoretical model of
the paper or Bayes
'
Rule. (See Table 2). For conditions 1 and 5
(positive case history) the means of .64 and .68 hover very close to
62.5, the results one would obtain through simple averaging of the two
results one would obtain through simple averaging of the two pieces of
data provided. Also, for conditions 2 and 6 (negative case history),
simple averaging would result in 42.5, close to the obtained means of
.48 and .45. Conditions 3 and 7 (vague case history) produce results,
.68 and .67, startingly like those found in conditions 1 and 5. Results
of .34 and .36 for conditions 4 and 8 (no case history) correspond to
the hypothesis that subjects use either causal or statistical base-rates
accurately when no additional information influences them. Figure #2
presents the distribution responses for Study 2 and highlights the
relatively small amount of variance. No significant statistical dif-
ference exists between causal and statistical base-rate use or among
the results for the positive, negative or vague conditions F( 5 ,54) =
.09, ns . However, the mean results for the negative condition is quite
a bit lower than for the positive or vague conditions. The lack of
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statistical significance may be due to the small number of subjects
tested in these cells.
Discussion
Several issues raised by the results will be explored. The first
of these is the finding that subjects used the causal and statistical
base-rates to the same extent. This is not consistent with either the
predictions of this study or findings of previous studies which demon-
strate that causal data have a greater impact in predictions than do
diagnostic data (Ajzen 1977; Bar-Hillel, 1977; Tversky and Kahneman,
1977). At first glace this suggests that the entire notion that pre-
dictors use some form of hypothesis confirming strategy is erroneous.
However, it may be that the causal link which must be established in
this confirming process does not necessarily conform to an actual
causal relationship but to a notion that people are able to "feel"
something happened "because" of a certain situation and consequently
see the data as lending support or confirmation to a notion or hypo-
thesis.
Tversky and Kahneman (1977) discuss the idea that data must
correspond to some preexisting causal schema and when they do, base-
rates are used. They point out that an individual's causal schema
represents an association between a cause and an effect in which the
cause precedes the effect both logically and temporally; an individual's
existing causal schema is one that connects earlier manifestations as
a cause of subsequent manifestations of the same system. This outlines
a notion regarding causal itly as more complex than that implied by
32
merely offering subjects a causal base-rate. A single isolated item
of information cannot be viewed as "causal" unless considered in the
larger causal schema. It may be just his conceptualization that helps
sort through the discrepancy between the hypothesis of the study and
the findings. Perhaps what is of importance isn't so much whether the
base-rate is actually "causal" or not, but whether it is seen as ex-
plicitly related to the content area potentiating the prediction and
consequently available as a piece of confirming information for the
hypothesis generated. Cause may not be used by subjects in a fashion
that is logically satisfying but in a way that corresponds to the notion
of causal schema. Antecontal data from students about why they used or
didn't use particular base-rates suggests a similar process at work for
both causal and statistical base-rates.
"I used the information about girls getting sick (causal base-
rate) because Deborah is a girl."
"I had to use all of the information because Deborah was like a
student in that nursing study so it was more probably she'd get sick."
(statistical base-rate).
Both of the base-rates related specifically to the content area
(girls getting sick) and are viable items for support of a causal schema
The subjects seem to hold an hypothesis and any particular information
which may help explain why the hypothesis is true.
In addition to the hypothesis concerning the use of causal vs.
statistical base-rates, this paper put forth the contention that when
individuating information is contrary to the causal notions suggested
by the base-rate or not confirming of the hypothesis, the individuating
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information takes priority over the base-rate and the base-rate is es-
sentially ignored. However, it is clear that in all cases, subjects
used both the individuating information and the base-rates. It may
have been erroneous to assume that the notion of hypothesis confirming
strategies would cause the total ignoring of a base-rate when followed
by a case history in conflict or not confirming of that hypothesis.
In fact, it now seems likely that if the subject supposes that what is
to be predicted has happened (e.g., illness in Deborah), he/she searches
for the information that might confirm or disconfirm why that may be,
such as considering the high incidence of illness in women and Deborah's
personal state of health. In the negative or non-confirming condition
Deborah's state of health is perceived as quite good and it is of course
a crucial assessment in making the prediction. But "because" women get
sick quite often and a large percentage of ill women were interviewed,
this must be taken into consideration. If the prediction question
established an hypothesis (e.g., how likely is Deborah to develop an
upper respiratory infection? -- becomes -- Hypothesis: "Deborah will
contract an upper respiratory infection" the subject searches for
plausible reasons why that may be even though she is "healthy." This
parallels Snyder's (1979) findings that people go to great lengths in
order to find d?.ta which confirm existing hypothesis. In this case it
may not seem logical to say she's susceptible to developing an illness
because she's in the nursing student's study but it does suggest a
"because" link. It would be interesting to explore the results that
would be obtained if the question had asked "How likely is she to remain
well?".
use
Conditions 4 and 8 correspond to the hypothesis that subjects
either causal or statistical base-rates accurately when no additional
information is provided, replicating a multitude of previous studies.
People are able and do use base-rate when they have nothing else upon
which to base their prediction.
In the vague conditions, subjects not only used the base-rates as
well as the individuating information, but in some fashion increased
either the impact of the base-rate in the prediction or increased the
perceived likelihood of Deborah's vulnerability to contracting an
illness. As discussed previously, pretesting had established the like-
lihood at X = .28, whereas results for these conditions with the
statistical or causal base-rate and vague case produced X = .67.
Regardless, the findings conform with those for the positive condition
which was designed to confirm the hypothesis and encourage one to make
a prediction that illness was likely to occur (pilot data — X = .55).
Because the findings for the vague conditions are so close to the find-
ings for the positive conditions, it seems reasonable to suggest that
in some fashion the diagnosticity of vague indicant information is
mediated by the causal base-rate provided; the likelihood ratio is
therefore increased. Perhaps because the case is vague, once an hypo-
thesis is established, subjects are allowed to use the given information
in either direction as confirmation for the hypothesis. As long as
the information does not directly invalidate the hypothesis, then con-
ceivably it "supports" it. In this way the vague material may take
on weighted value and in this case a positive one. This too seems
consistent with the pervasive attempts by Snyder's subjects (1979) to
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seek confirmation for their hypothesis using most un-useful forms of
information. (It would be interesting to invert the statistical base-
rate using the same vague case presentation in order to explore whether
vague information is influenced in both directions.)
Abelson (1974), Ajzen (1977) and Tversky and Kahneman (1977) have
suggested that individuals carry with them scripts or causal schemata
that they apply to predicting events and occurrences in the world; that
this is so seems likely. The notion of these scripts or schemata con-
veys a sort of stable or consistent overtime idea. However, what may
Took stable or constant because it is well defined and logically con-
sistent may in fact be much more transient and a product of the con-
tinuous process of people always being directed to attend to particular
information based on hypotheses that they generate in specific points
in time.
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL DISCUSSION
One basic contention of this paper has been that the prediction
task may undergo redefinition by people into one that establishes an
hypothesis that requires confirmation by specific information. It was
suggested that implicitly this altered task is one of attribution, or
explaining wny something "is" or "happened" in a certain way. The over-
all hypothesis made by the two studies contended that base-rates would
be used if they were causal and additionally even causal base-rates
would not be used if pertinent indicant information was not confirming
of the hypothesis established by the base-rate. However, the findings
of the two studies do not conform to these predictions. A critical
analysis must be taken to explore what in fact may be producing the
present results.
Initially, the "causal" nature of a base-rate must be considered.
As was pointed out previously, (Ajzen, 1977) the distinction between
what is causal and what isn't has been based largely upon researcher
intuition. From the informal discussion with subjects, it seems that
people tend to use information as a "cause" or "because" whether or
not it actually possess a logical cause and effect relationship. The
parallel finding between statistical and causal base-rates in all but
one condition of both studies tends to confirm that indeed subjects
regarded both types of base-rates as similarly relevant to them in
their predictions. Consideration of the one condition in which subjects
failed to use the statistical base-rate to the same extent as the
36
37
causal may be helpful in explaining the dynamic at work. In that con-
dition (study l, condition 2) the statistical base-rate presents a mere
population ratio regarding the number of male and female students and
it is in no way specifically related to the content of the prediction
question. As such, it offers no information with which to confirm
the hypothesis that might be established from the prediction question
which is asked.
In Study 1 subjects were asked the probability that a person,
selected at random from those with upper respiratory infections lasting
in excess of
-two weeks was a male student. The two relevant items of
content are males developing the illness and the duration of the illness
for males, not the proportion of males and females. Subjects may con-
sider the question to establish an hypothesis with clear dimensions of
what one ought to consider in order to confirm its truth, and then
attend to only those base-rates with that content.
In Study 2 the subjects were asked the probability that a particular
student, Deborah would develop an upper respiratory infection. The
hypothesis that might be generated would direct the subject to consider
that information that would confirm illness occurring in Deborah; in
other words, both the indicant information and base-rates on incidence
of the illness.
Contrary to the present findings, Ajzen (1977) found that causal
base-rates had a stronger effect on predictions than non-causal. How-
ever, his findings also indicated a significant effect for conditions
that were presented "75% passed" as opposed to "75% failed." The
question used to measure responses was "the probability that Gary U.
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was among the students who passed the exam is
—
i
n light of the
present discussion the content of the question would recommend to subjects
that they attend to information about Gary and passing the exam, not
necessarily failing the exam. Perhaps this accounts for the variation
in use of statistical and causal base-rates and may be consistent with
the present analysis.
The findings of these studies are not those that were initially
predicted. The discussion attempts to resolve the apparent conflict
and offers an explanation for the results. The notion that the prediction
question tells the subject what is relevant information to consider
must, of course, be emperically tested. Snyder (1979) has pointed out
that people tend to seek to confirm hypotheses as if those hypotheses
were a reality. And Ajzen, Dal to and Blyth (1978) have pointed out
that one's cognitive set may produce a tendency to interpret ambiguous
information as consistent with the hypothesis in question. It follows
that people might consider the prediction question (i.e. hypothesis)
as real and use related ambiguous information as confirming.
It is unfortunate that non-significance is rarely reported in
journals because it may be that other researchers have also had dif-
ficulty duplicating the lack of difference between causal and statis-
tical base-rates. Recent studies under the direction of Pollatsek
(1980) have had a similar experience in failing to replicate the causal/
non-causal difference.
Contrary to conclusions from previous prediction studies, the
findings of the present research indicate that when two base-rates are
used, subjects' predictions conform quite well to a Baysian analysis
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and are consistant with the tradition that people form and revise beliefs
in an orderly and rational fashion in accordance with normative principles
of statistical models (see Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1971). However, such
outcomes shed little light on the actual process one uses when predicting;
how does the subject choose what information to use, and what form of
expression does he use to combine that information? Reliance on paper
and pencil questionaires limits the understanding of the process and
encourages conclusions drawn from results. It would be the essential
next step for the theoretical process presented in this paper to be
explored through in-depth interviews and discussion with subjects about
their conscious rationale for decisions. Pollatsek (1980) has been doing
studies in this fashion and has thus far found it a useful tool for
understanding the subjects' thinking process.
Central to all of the issues raised by the present studies is the
question of what is or is not "causal." A series of studies designed
in a fashion that offered information to subjects in a range of content
areas and asks them to make particular predictions and to explain why
would be a first essential step. Wedded to this could be the attribution
task, that is, to provide subjects with an hypothesis and ask them to
determine what factors influenced its occurrance and why. It seems in
this fashion both the problem of the causal link could be explored as
well as its relationship to the proposal made by this paper, that part
of the prediction task is hypothesis confirmation and somewhat attrib-
utional in nature.
A second area of study ought to center upon varying the specific
content areas in the prediction question in order to see if use of
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particular base-rates can be manipulated by the content of the question
The third area might explore similarities between treating a
hypothesis as a reality and seeking confirmation and the manner in
which subjects use base-rates. It appears that the present limited
research raises a number of questions more than it answers.
Table 1
The Mean Probabilities of Male Being Chosen at Random, Compared
to the Predicted Means and Means Produced
by Use of Bayes' Rule
Type of
base-rate a
Mean
Probabil i ties
(Results)
Incidence of
colds by sex
(1)
.57
Duration of
colds by sex
Incidence of
colds by sex
(2)
.32
Sex distributions
at Hebrew University
Designed incidence
by sex
(3) .49
Duration of cold
by sex
Thesis
Predictions
.56
.30
75
"Bayes 1 "
Predictions
.56
56
56
Designed incidence
by sex
(4)
Designed duration
by sex
.58
.56 .56
Note , n = 10 per cell; F (3, 36) = 9.72, p > .05
a
Numbers in parentheses indicate the "condition number."
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Table 2
Mean Probabilities of Deborah Contracting an Illness Under Differenttxperimental Conditions Compared to the Predicted Means
and Means Produced by Use of Bayes ' Rule
Type of
base-rate ' 'YPe of Indicant Information
Positive Negative Vague
Results Thesis Results 0
T
^
S
I
S
J Results Thesis
Predicted Predicted
^suii
Predicted
Incidence of/,%
colds in [l)
.64 .74 (2)
.48 .15 (3) 68 47
femal es
(causal
)
Designed (c .
incidence^
.58 .55 loj .45 .15 (7)
.67 .28
of colds
in females
(statistical
)
*.74 *.29 *.47
Note , n = 10 per cell
a
Numbers in parentheses indicate the "condition number."
Denotes results one would obtain through use of Bayes' Rule
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Figure Captions
Figure 1: Distribution of responses for subier^' n^r+^„,
two base-rates. In this graph! the nilers n re
K
Z ^iSnttfC9the condition; Md stands for Median; X stands for Mean The ranqepresented subjects runs from 0% to 100%. g
Figure 2: Distribution of responses for subjects' predictions usinaone base-rate and indicant information. In this graph! the umbers
in.
P
M
renthe
r!
S ld6ntify the condi ^"ons; Md stands for Median! X standsfor Mean. The range presented subjects runs from 0% to 100%
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University students are at risk for a range of particular health
problems. The typical age span of 18 to 24 years predisposes students
to contract certain illnesses and the nature of group living inherent
in campus life enhances the spread of contagious disease. Information
concerning the health behavior of students suggests that they are often
either unaware of these problems or have difficulty using information
to prevent or treat an illness once contracted. Usually illnesses for
this group are mild and relatively self-limiting. However, a large
number of students, because of risk factors such as general health
status, diet, and stress and the like become quite ill and require
hospitalization. Some may even develop chronic, long-term conditions.
Prevention and early diagnosis would decrease the number of individuals
whose illnesses become severe enough to require hospitalization.
Students themselves are in the strongest position to prevent these
diseases through early self diagnosis. It is important to be able to
combine one's knowledge of an illness with predisposing factors and
existing patterns in order to make a judgment about ways to avoid or
restrict the severity of an illness.
In order to assess students' ability to take into account factors
affecting contracting and treating an illness, you will be presented
with information describing the prevalence of an illness and/or an
individual case history of a university student chosen at random. You
will be asked to make a probability judgment about occurrence of a
particular illness.
After you have completed the questional re
,
you will be given
information pertinent to understanding this process of diagnostic
prediction.
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APPENDIX 2
STUDY I
Condition 1
Records from Israeli University Health Services indicate that ,mnpr
™nn
P
^ry i? feCt1 ° n (C°mm0n C° 1dS) m the Ssl~ es
U
7$of I l rl pf 396 S,tUd?ntS ' ,°Uring the 1978~ 79 academic year0/, of all cases were female students and 30% were male students.
The percentage of upper respiratory infections that last in excess of
students
15 t1meS hi9h6r am0nQ malS StudentS than among finale
What is the probability that a student, selected at random from those
with upper respiratory infections lasting in excess of two weeks, was
a male student?
IM 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Hot Absolutely
1 likely
likely
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STUDY I
Condition 2
Records from Israeli University Health Services indicate that uonor
amonol !
r
Ll feCti °nS Cr° n C° lds) are the most common ne esong all co lege age students. During the 1978-79 academic year 70"of all cases were of female students and 30% were male students
studeStT
UniVerSlty there are three times more ^ students than female
What is the probability that a student at Hebrew University, selected
at random from those with upper respiratory infections, was a male
s uiiuent i
M 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
^ Absolutely
?J, , likelylikely J
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STUDY I
Condition 3
Nationwide the percentage of upper respiratory infections that last in
excess of two weeks is three times higher among male students than
among female students.
What is the probability that a student selected at random from those
with upper respiratory infections lasting in excess of two weeks was
a male student?
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Not
at all
1 ikely
Absol utely
likely
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STUDY I
Condition 4
LZVof T reW U"i™™*y «d a study on the health be-
As r"sun
fe
^
9
o?
r
h:,-
UPPer
,
reSP,rat0ry mfec
y
t1o
f
™ 'co^^^ds °
^
a a res lt, 70/o f er sample were women and only 30% of those sheinterviewed were male students suffering from upper respiratory Infections
As it turned out, she was also interested in how the length of anillness effects males and females differently. Consequently she choseher subjects such that three times more male students than female
two weeks
respiratory infect ions that lasted in excess of
What is the probability that a student selected at random from those
with upper respiratory infections lasting in excess of two weeks, was
a male student?
9% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 1 00%
Not
at all
1 ikely
Absol utely
1 ikely
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STUDY II
Condition 1
Records from Israeli University Health Services indict* m a+
EE^l?" i?feCti °nS {— C° lds) ^ ™n nes^Iamong all college age students. During the 1978-79 academ r Tell wof all female students contracted an upper respirftorv infectionVsome time during the year. Only 30% of'the feSalfsS<tenS 5?d not.
Deborah Cohen is a Hebrew University freshman who has an "undecided"
7rl
° i,
SHe
"I
lnterested ^ history but wants to be able to find ajob after graduation. Consequently, she is carrying 18 credits and
o?fere°d
rSe
Shp
n
if
V
t
ral in °^er to ge't a feeT fc^hatis f re . e s struggling to maintain a B+ average. Deborah isvery involved with social activities and feels a great deal o? pul
pTu,«n
a"demic and social commitments. She finds little time toeat well and is slightly underweight. Deborah lives in the dorm andhas two roommates.
What is the probability that Deborah will develop an upper respiratoryinfection? J
% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
N° t
„ Absolutely
at all
1 ikely
likely
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STUDY II
Condition 2
Records from the Israeli University Health Services inW-i^+Q ^ *
eS
7 I°
*
J
oll ^e age students. During the 1978-79 academicyear 0/o of all female students contracted an upper resDiratnrvinfection at some time during the year. Only aoSIf t'hTf^students
maior^ s£
e
?Ji I
Heb
+
re
!!
Uni
u
versity Ashman who has an "undecided"
after'ara^t on %T tGd in hlSt°7 but Wants to be ab1e to find a jobtter gradua i . She is carrying 12 credits and easily maintains a P,+average Deborah is a health food enthusiast and enjoys cooking herown meals She runs at least 4 kilometers a day t her stay Zshape. Deborah has a single room in the dorm. 7
infection?
6 probabi1ity that Deborah wil1 develop an upper respiratory
0* 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Not
at all
likely
Absolutely
likely
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STUDY II
Condition 3
son,e tin* during the year. Only 30. oTtte^M^S'Sd''^.
ma
6
ior
ah
ShMnJ.!*?!! Un1^rsU>' "«h-n who has an "undecided"
Zl ^ ! interested in hmory but wants to be able to find a
iVllZZ ^ " Carry1nS the USUal 12 c-dUs andItntains
inreciionT
probab1111
» that Deborah wi " d«elop an upper respiratory
—M 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 707, 80% 90% TOM
U?*„ Absolutely
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STUDY II
Condition 4
Records from the Israeli University Health Service indict* *ha+
a™ra^i? feCti ° nS (Cr° n C01 ^S) ^ the Ss? 1 seT"mong ll college age students. During the 1978-79 academ c vear 70?of all cases were of female students and 30% were ma?e students
What is the probability that a student, selected at random from thosewith upper respiratory infections, was a male student?
—2* 30% 40% 50% 50% 70% m 90%___100%
Absolu
likely
at all tely
1 ikely
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STUDY II
Condition 5
A nursing student at Hebrew University did a studv nn thp h^in, •
? iL"h- ^CaUSe ShG WaS - wo" n^r
V
io
r
' se chose t0 interview mostly female students who had o^were
% h 9 r°m ^Pper res Plrat0 ^y infections (common colds). As a result
and "y^th^"6 ren +SUffen
'
ng fr0m uPPer ^plratory infect o s'only 30/o of those she interviewed were women who were not.
Deborah Cohen is a Hebrew University freshman who has an "undecided"
major She is interested in history but wants to be able to find ajob after graduation. Consequently, she is carrying 18 credits andtaking courses in several departments in order to get a feel for whatis offered. She is struggling to maintain a B+ average. Deborah is
very involved with social activities and feels a great deal of pullfrom both academic and social commitments. She finds little time to
eat well and is slightly underweight. Deborah lives in the dorm and
has two roommates.
What is the probability that Deborah will develop an upper respiratory
infection?
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Not Absolutely
at all likely
1 ikely
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STUDY II
Condition 6
A nursing student at Hebrew University did a studv nn the h«i+h u Q u •
°t m^she^ t^T ?n h™ wo"IT
r
"
were h f f 0 1ntemew ™stly female students who had or
a ^sult
e
^
g
!
r
°^uPP^/^piratory infections (common colds). Asresu , 70/o of her sample were women suffering from upper resDiratnrvinfections and only 30% of those she interviewed' were Zen who'were
"
Deborah Cohen is a Hebrew University freshman who has an "undecided"
major She is interested in history but wants to be able to find ajob after graduation. She is carrying 12 credits and easily maintains
a B+ average. Deborah is a health food enthusiast and enjoys cookingher own meals. She runs at least 4 kilometers a day to help her stayin shape. Deborah has a single room in the dorm.
What is the probability that Deborah will develop an upper respiratory
infection?
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
N ° t
„ Absolutely
at all
1 i kely
1 i kely
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STUDY II
Condition 7
a resu t s 70/o of her sample were women suffering from upper resoiratnrvinfections and only 30% of those she interviewed were Zen whoTre
"
Deborah Cohen is a Hebrew University freshman who has an "undecided"
major. She is interested in history but wants to be able to find a jobafter graduation. She is carrying the usual 12 credits and maintain
a d+ average.
infection?
6 pr°bability that Deborah w^ develop an upper respiratory
91 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Not Absolutely
at a 1 likely
likely
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STUDY II
Condition 8
to illness ch
sne was primarily interested in how women react
wi?J lL!J
e P r°bability> that a student selected at random from thoseth upper respiratory infections was a male student?
—2* M__20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80°; gn* 100%
Not
at all Absolutely
likely 1lke] y


